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Harmonizing Europe’s Human Rights System*1)
- The European Union’s Accession to the European Convention 




  This article gives a brief overview of the European human rights system and 
the two basic actors, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR). It is not surprising that these two courts, which have 
such different traditions, sometimes interpret the same human rights provisions in 
a different way. This issue shall be depicted by way of using the example of their 
differing interpretation of the Article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR) in the cases of Orkem before the ECJ, Funke and Saunders before 
the ECtHR and finally Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij before the ECJ. In the cases 
mentioned above, the courts have not only shown fundamentally different 
approaches to determine the meaning of the nemo tenetur principle in cases concerning 
economic proceedings. The ECJ has also upheld its less human-rights-friendly 
approach after dealing with the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in the matter, thus disregarding 
the opinion of the court that is competent to interpret the ECHR.
  This article afterwards presents one of the major problems arising in the 
accession process. The European Union (EU)’s fear of external judicial control 
shall serve as an example for the difficulties arising with the accession of a 
supranational organization sui generis to a convention to which all of its member 
states are already members. This article presents the proposed solution to this 
problem, the so-called co-respondent mechanism.
  Finally, a brief look into the future poses the question whether the upcoming 
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accession of the EU to the ECHR can harmonize the human rights jurisprudence 
in the EU. It is the opinion of the author that such a step has the potential to 
promote a consistent and understandable European human rights system and to 
strengthen the European people’s trust in the European legal order.
Keywords: accession, co-respondent mechanism, European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), European Court of Justice (ECJ), nemo tenetur
I. Introduction
 
Understandability is an essential prerequisite for trust in a legal order. If people 
can understand legal decisions and their making, they tend to have fewer problems 
accepting the system itself. Yet, for most European people, the human rights 
system of the European Union (EU) seems absurdly complicated, even for the 
standards of a legal order consisting of 27 member states with various legal 
traditions. Worst of all, the European courts in Luxemburg and Strasbourg seem 
to contradict each other in essential questions of the protection of human rights. A 
solution to this problem could be the upcoming accession of the EU to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (formally the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECHR). Learning from 
history that every solution in Europe has had its complications, it becomes evident 
that this act also bears a high potential for conflicts in the future.
II. The European Courts
A well-known problem in European law is the confusing terminology. Entirely 
different organs and measures have similar names.1) This is also true for the 
1) The most prominent example is probably the word “council”. Both the “Council of the 
European Union” and the “European Council” are organs of the European Union. They 
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courts that deal with human rights issues in Europe. Judicial protection of human 
rights on the European level is generally granted by two courts: the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxemburg and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in Strasbourg, France.2) 
1. European Court of Justice
The ECJ is the highest judicial organ of the EU, a unique legal entity consisting 
of 27 member states. What started as a new form of economic cooperation has 
now reached a never-before seen extent of economic, cultural and political integration.3) 
The ECJ has often fueled this integration with groundbreaking decisions.4) In the 
field of human rights, however, the ECJ has long defended the concept of a mere 
economic court. In the first years of the ECJ, questions of human rights protection 
have not played an important part in its jurisprudence.5) Although the court’s 
self-concept has changed over the decades, this tradition can still be seen even in 
recent case-law.
Since the degree of integration is so high in the EU, the ECJ can apply a 
homogeneous legal regime when dealing with human rights problems in EU law. 
Nonetheless, the ECJ has shown tendencies to respect to a certain extent the 
differences in the national legal traditions.6) 
2. European Court of Human Rights
Unlike the ECJ, the ECtHR is an outright human rights court. It was 
established to enforce the ECHR, a treaty drafted by the Council of Europe, as an 
are not to be confused with the “Council of Europe”, an international organization of 
its own.
2) For a good overview of the European human rights system see Steven Greer, Europe, 
in: Daniel Moeckli/Sangeeta Shah/Sandesh Sivakumaran (Ed.), International Human 
Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.454 et seqq.
3) Rudolf Streinz, Europarecht (C.F. Mueller, 2012), pp.4-33.
4) Rudolf Streinz, op. cit., p.155.
5) Rudolf Streinz, op. cit., pp.268-269.
6) Rudolf Streinz, op. cit., pp.273-274.
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international organization with the goal of promoting cooperation between the 
European states in the fields of human rights, legal standards, culture and 
democratic development.7) Membership to the Council of Europe is open to all 
European countries. As a result, almost all European countries have acceded to the 
ECHR. The Council of Europe now has 47 member states.
The ECtHR has the delicate mission to apply a carefully but sometimes cloudy 
worded human rights treaty to cases in 47 states with very different legal traditions 
and socio-economic standards. Apparently it manages this situation very well, which 
can be seen by the increasing number of cases in the last years.8) Ironically, this 
success and the subsequent “workload crisis”9) are one of the biggest problems of 
the court nowadays.
III. The European Union’s Human Rights System 
after the Lisbon Treaty
With the latest reformation of the constitutional basis of the EU through the 
so-called Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s human rights system experienced some significant 
changes. This can be seen in the changes in the wording of Article 6 of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), which shows the three sources of human rights 
in the EU.
7) Rudolf Streinz, op. cit., pp.28-33.
8) Cf. Annual reports of the ECtHR, available under http://www.echr.coe.int.
9) Alistair Mowbray, The European Convention on Human Rights, in: Mashood 
Baderin/Manisuli Ssenyonjo (Ed.), International Human Rights Law – Six Decades 
after the UDHR and Beyond (Ashgate 2010), pp.279 et seqq.
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Article 6 TEU (old) Article 6 TEU (new)
1. The Union is founded on the prin- 
ciples of liberty, democracy, respect 
for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the 
Member States.
2. The Union shall respect fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 
November 1950 and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community 
law.
1. The Union recognizes the rights, 
freedoms and principles set out in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union of 7 December
2000, as adopted at Strasbourg, on 
12 December 2007, which shall have
the same legal value as the treaties.
(…)
2. The Union shall accede to the 
European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. Such accession shall not 
affect the Union’s competences as 
defined in the Treaties.
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed 
by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and as they 
result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, shall 
constitute general principles of the 
Union’s law.
Article 6 (1) of the TEU now states that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, the EU’s own human rights charter (which is not to be 
confused with the ECHR), has the same legal value as the treaties of the EU. 
This charter comprises a human rights catalogue that is now binding on the EU 
organs.
Before the Lisbon Treaty, the only relation between the EU and the ECHR was 
the EU’s pledge to respect the fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR. 
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The new Article 6 (2) of the TEU now calls upon the EU to accede to the 
ECHR. This would have the same binding effect upon the EU as the accession of 
any state would have on the said state.
Like before Lisbon, Article 6 (3) of the TEU lays down the commitment to the 
human rights derived from the ECHR and the constitutional traditions of the 
member states.
These three sources of human rights in European law are to be the basis of a 
consistent European human rights system.10) Yet, the practice of the European 
courts in the past has shown a tendency to interpret certain human rights in 
fundamentally different ways.
IV. Inconsistencies in the Jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights
A prominent example for the different approach of the ECJ and the ECtHR in 
the question of human rights protection is their contrarious understanding of the 
principle of nemo tenetur (privilege against self-incrimination) in cases regarding 
inquiries because of antitrust regulations.
1. ECJ Case C-374/87 of 18 October 1989— “Orkem”
The first of a series of European cases dealing with the problem was the case 
of Orkem before the ECJ. Orkem was a French-based chemical company. The 
European Commission required Orkem to answer questions set out in a formal 
request for information. This was because of an ongoing inquiry into the existence 
of agreements and concerted practices contrary to the EU antitrust regulations. EU 
antitrust law required undertakings to cooperate actively in such cases under the 
threat of sensitive fines. Orkem did not produce the answers and relied, inter alia, 
on the principle of nemo tenetur. This principle is typically read into Art. 6 of 
10) Rudolf Streinz, op. cit., pp.268-276.
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the ECHR.11) 
The ECJ found that a comparative analysis of national law did not indicate the 
existence of such a principle saying “which may be relied upon by legal persons 
in relation to infringements in the economic sphere, in particular infringements of 
competition law.”12) It stated that as far as Article 6 of the ECHR was concerned, 
“although it may be relied upon by an undertaking subject to an investigation 
relating to competition law, it must be observed that neither the wording of that 
article nor the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights indicate that it 
upholds the right not to give evidence against oneself.”13) The court found that 
the European Commission may not compel an undertaking to provide it with 
answers which might involve an admission on its part of the existence of an 
infringement “which is incumbent upon the commission to prove.”14) However, it 
concluded that Article 6 of the ECHR did not stand in the way of the European 
Commission’s conduct.15) Consequently, with respect to this specific question, 
Orkem’s application was dismissed.16) 
It is notable that the ECJ mentioned the lack of relevant case law of the 
ECtHR before deciding the case since the ECtHR is the primary source for 
interpretation of the ECHR. This lead lawyers and scholars to expect that a 
differing decision of the ECtHR would most likely change the ECJ’s jurisprudence 
with respect to this question.
11) Wolfgang Peukert, in: Jochen Frowein/Wolfgang Peukert, Europäische Menschen- 
RechtsKonvention-EMRK-Kommentar (Engel, 2009), p.194 (Article 6, para.130); Frank 
Meyer, in: Ulrich Karpenstein/Franz Mayer, EMRK-Konvention zum Schutz der 
Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, (C.H. Beck 2012), p.173 (Article 6, para. 127).
12) ECJ, Case C-374/87 of 18 October 1989 “Orkem”, para. 29.
13) Orkem, para. 30.
14) Orkem, para. 35.
15) Orkem, para. 40.
16) Orkem, para. 42.
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2. ECtHR Case 10828/84 of 25 February 1993— “Funke v. France”
Such a decision came with the case of “Funke v. France” before the ECtHR. 
Jean-Gustave Funke was a German national living in France. The French authorities 
asked Funke to hand over his bank records in relation to alleged breaches of the 
French regulations governing financial dealings with foreign countries. Funke was 
sentenced to a fixed fine and a penalty of 20 francs per day, which was later 
raised to 50 francs per day, until he would produce the requested bank records. 
He argued that the compulsion to hand over the documents violated the principle 
of nemo tenetur.
The ECtHR noted that the customs secured Funke’s conviction “in order to 
obtain certain documents which they believed must exist, although they were not 
certain of the fact.”17) Being “unable or unwilling to produce them by some other 
means, they attempted to compel the applicant himself to provide the evidence of 
offences he had allegedly committed.”18) In contrast to the ECJ, the ECtHR found 
that Article 6 of the ECHR indeed contained a privilege against self-incrimination 
that is also applicable in economic cases.19) Accordingly, the court came to the 
conclusion that there had been a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR.
3. ECtHR Case 19187/91 of 17 December 1996— “Saunders v. UK”
After establishing its interpretation of Article 6 of the ECHR in “Funke v. 
France”, the ECtHR upheld and strengthened its line of argument in Saunders v. 
UK. Ernest Saunders was a British national working as a director and chief 
executive for Guiness PLC. Saunders was questioned several times by the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) because of alleged unlawful share-support operations 
in relation to the takeover of Distillers Company PLC. Transcripts from those 
questionings were later used in the criminal trial against Saunders. The British 
Court of Appeal did not see a problem with the privilege against self-incrimination 
and upheld Saunders’ conviction, noticing that “the Parliament has expressly and 
17) ECtHR Case 10828/84 of 25 February 1993 – “Funke v. France”, para. 44.
18) Funke, para. 44.
19) Funke, para. 44.
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unambiguously provided in the 1985 Act that answers given to DTI inspectors 
may be admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings even though such admittance 
might override the privilege against self-incrimination.”
It was disputed by the government of the United Kingdom that the applicant 
was subject to legal compulsion to give evidence to the inspectors. He had been 
obliged under sections 434 and 436 of the Companies Act of 1985 “to answer the 
questions put to him by the inspectors in the course of nine lengthy interviews of 
which seven were later admissible as evidence at his (criminal) trial.”20) The 
ECtHR, however, did not accept the government’s argument that “the complexity 
of corporate fraud and the vital public interest in the investigation of such fraud 
and the punishment of those responsible could justify such a marked departure as 
that which occurred in the present case from one of the basic principles of a fair 
procedure” and concluded that there had been an infringement of the right not to 
incriminate oneself.21) 
Conclusively, Saunders v. UK was read as a clear affirmation of the ECtHR’s 
Funke jurisprudence and the extensive interpretation of Article 6 of the ECHR in 
economic circumstances.
4. ECJ Case C-238/99 P of 15 October 2002
— “Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij”
It was expected that the ECJ would adopt the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 
6 of the ECHR in similar cases. Surprisingly however, the court upheld its Orkem 
jurisprudence in the case of Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij (LVM). The chemical 
company LVM and eight other undertakings were subject to investigations in 
relation to alleged meetings in order to fix market prices and target quotas in the 
polypropylene sector. LVM and another applicant disputed the legality, in 
particular under Article 6 of the ECHR, on all the information obtained from the 
undertakings by the European Commission in the antitrust procedure.
20) ECtHR Case 19187/91 of 17 December 1996 – “Saunders v. UK”, para. 70.
21) Saunders, para. 74.
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The appellants submitted that Article 6 of the ECHR, as interpreted by the 
ECtHR in Funke v. France and Saunders v. United Kingdom laid down “a right 
to remain silent and in no way to contribute to one’s own incrimination, without 
any distinction being made according to the type of information requested.”22) 
They stated that this right precluded the situation in which an undertaking was 
itself required “to provide evidence of infringements which it had committed in 
any form, including documentary form.”23) 
The parties agreed that there had been further developments in the case-law of 
the ECtHR since Orkem which the EU judicature had to take into account when 
interpreting the fundamental rights of the ECHR.24) However, the ECJ followed 
that “examined in the light of that finding and the specific circumstances of the 
present case, the ground of appeal alleging infringements of the privilege against 
self-incrimination (did) not permit the annulment of the contested judgment on the 
basis of the developments in the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights.”25) It argued that an undertaking is not obliged to reply to a request for 
information “since the penalty provided for in Article 15 (1) (b) of Regulation 
No. 17 applies only where, having agreed to reply, the undertaking provides 
inaccurate information.”26) 
The case of LVM showed that the two European courts still had a fundamentally 
different understanding of the interpretation and protection of the rights of ECHR. 
This constitutes the dissatisfying situation in which an identical case would very 
likely be treated different in Luxemburg and Strasbourg.
22) ECJ Case C-238/99 P of 15 October 2002 – “Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij”, para. 
259.
23) Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij, para. 259.
24) Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij, para. 274.
25) Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij, para. 276.
26) Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij, para. 279.
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V. Accession
A solution to this problem could be the EU’s accession to the ECHR as 
demanded by Article 6 II of the TEU. As a member, the EU and its organs (such 
as the ECJ) would be bound not only by the wording of the ECHR but also by 
the decisions of the ECtHR.27) ECJ jurisprudence that differs from the ECtHR’s 
interpretation would then constitute a breach of the ECHR for which the EU 
could be held accountable.28) 
1. Legal Prerequisites for the Accession
As appealing as the accession might be, it requires fundamental changes of the 
legal constitution of the EU as well as of the ECHR itself.29) The idea of the 
EU’s accession to the ECHR has a long and, one might say, frustrating history. 
But after several decades and countless setbacks this step is now legally achievable.30) 
The EU fulfilled the basic prerequisites for its accession with the Lisbon Treaty. 
The new Article 6 (2) of the TEU enables the EU to accede to the ECHR, hence 
eliminating the lack of a legal basis for the accession that was pointed out by the 
ECJ in its Opinion 2/94.31) Now the EU has a clear and explicit competence to 
become a member state to the ECHR with all rights and duties that come along 
with this step.
On the other hand, the Council of Europe prepared the ECHR for the accession 
of the EU with Protocol 14 to the ECHR in 2010.32) 
27) This provision is explicitly laid down in Article 46 I ECHR.
28) Rudolf Streinz, op. cit., p.275.
29) For a good overview of the legal aspects of the accession process see Jean Paul 
Jacqué, L’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme et des libertés fondamentales, European Yearbook on Human Rights 11 
(2011), pp.143-158.
30) Paul Gragl, Accession Revisited: Will Fundamental Rights Protection Trump the 
European Union’s Legal Autonomy?, European Yearbook on Human Rights 11 (2011), 
pp. 159-172, at 159.
31) ECJ, Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 28 March 1996.
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But those provisions could not alone solve the countless problems that arise 
when a legal entity such as the EU enters a human rights treaty to which all of 
its members are already members. The necessary changes of the constitutional 
basis through the Lisbon Treaty and the Protocol 14 only set the stage for the 
long and complex negotiation of the details of the accession process. So far, these 
negotiations lead to a draft agreement33) that will serve as the basis for further 
talks in this matter.
2. Identification of the Correct Respondent
One problem that illustrates the complexity of the legal execution of accession 
is the EU’s fear of an external judicial control of the system of competences of 
the European treaties. Article 6 (2) (b) of the TEU is owed to this fear.34)  
The problem becomes evident if an individual lodges an application directly 
against the EU or an EU-member state. All proceedings must be made against the 
entity truly responsible for the infringement.35) Due to the complicated system of 
competences in the EU, this question will not be easy to answer for individuals. 
The Protocol No. 8 to the Lisbon Treaty takes up this idea by stating that the 
agreement on accession “shall make a provision for preserving the specific 
characteristics of the Union and Union law, in particular with regard to the 
mechanisms necessary to ensure that proceedings by non-Member States and 
individual applicants are correctly addressed to Member States and/or the Union as 
appropriate.”36) Still, the main problem is that it is up to the individual applicant 
32) Protocol 14 was signed by all member states as early as 2006, yet Russia did not 
ratify it until 2010 due to political reasons.
33) I. Draft Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CDDH-UE(2011)16fin of 
19 July 2011.
34) Paul Gragl, op. cit., at 160.
35) Florence Benoît-Rohmer, Completing the Transformation: Values and Fundamental 
Rights in the Treaty of Lisbon, European Yearbook on Human Rights 10 (2010), pp. 
49-64, at 61 et seqq.
36) Protocol No. 8 relating to Article 6, para. 2 of the Treaty on European Union on the 
accession of the European Union to the European Convention on the Protection of 
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to assign the correct respondent. The complicated situation in the EU with the 
sharing of competences between the member states and the Union would require 
the ECtHR to determine whether the assigned respondent is indeed the correct 
one.37) The Strasbourg Court would consequently have to rule on the internal 
affairs of the EU, namely the division of competences between the EU and its 
member states.38) Such a ruling by any court other than the ECJ would be 
absolutely unacceptable from the EU’s perspective. Hence, the EU’s accession 
calls for a proceeding that enables individuals to open a proceeding before the 
ECtHR without having the problems of identifying the correct respondent.
The approach chosen by the draft agreement to avoid these delicate problems is 
the so-called co-respondent mechanism, which is laid down in Article 3 of the 
said agreement. The co-respondent mechanism would enable the EU or a member 
state to become a co-respondent alongside the original respondent and thus a party 
to the case. It can already be said that this approach would comply with the 
specific situation of the EU as a supranational organization with an autonomous 
legal system becoming a party to a convention to which its members are already 
members.39) But it is only one of several possible solutions to the posed problem.40) 
It remains to be seen whether the co-respondent mechanism will find its way into 
the final agreement and how it will be formed in detail.
Without a doubt, the EU and the Council of Europe will eventually solve this 
problem and all the other technical difficulties that arise with the EU’s accession 
to the ECHR. But bearing in mind the novelty of the situation and acknowledging 
that a thorough work is essential to avoid further complication sin future, it 
remains to be seen how long the accession process will take. 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
37) Paul Gragl, op. cit., at 166.
38) Paul Gragl, op. cit., at 166.
39) Paul Gragl, op. cit., at 172.
40) Paul Gragl, op. cit., at 171 et seqq.
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VI. Conclusion
The EU’s accession to the ECHR seems to be a matter of time. The accession 
process may take a while, but it will be worth the wait. After the accession, the 
EU will be held accountable for breaches of the ECHR by its organs. This situation 
alone will put a lot of pressure on the EU organs to comply with the ECtHR’s 
human-rights-friendly interpretation of the ECHR.
Only time can show whether the accession can also discipline the proudest of 
all EU organs, the ECJ. It would be desirable, since inconsistencies in the 
interpretation of fundamental human rights by the European courts cannot be 
tolerated any longer. The European public is not interested in the legal status or 
the different competences of the ECJ and the ECtHR. European citizens in Paris, 
London or Berlin want a reliable system of protection of their human rights. 
Maybe a little pressure from Strasbourg can lead to a harmonized jurisprudence 
and a consistent European human rights system. A system which can be understood 
and really be trusted would be a true blessing for the European continent.
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